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DID THE 7TH CIRCUIT 
PROPERLY RULE IN 
SENTINEL II?
R O N A L D  H .  F I L L E R 1
ARTICLE REPRINT
The short answer is YES; the long answer 
is TIME WILL TELL.2 
On March 19, 2014, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the 
ruling in the lower federal district court case 
and ruled that the pre-petition transfers and 
the post-petition transfers from the estate of 
Sentinel Management Group (“Sentinel”), a 
firm registered as both a futures commission 
merchant (“FCM”) with the U.S. Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) 
and as an investment adviser (“IA”) with the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”), were protected from being avoided.3 
As noted in more detail below, the Seventh 
Circuit based its decision on the interpreta-
tion of a plain reading of two specific bank-
ruptcy code provisions (Sections 546(e) for the 
pre-petition transfer and Section 549 for the 
post-petition transfer). However, the Seventh 
Circuit did, without any explanation or analy-
sis, agree with some of the conclusions of law 
noted in the district court case that did not in 
any way form the basis for its decision. It is 
this language in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion 
that might be most concerning for FCMs in 
the future. However, the 14 FCMs involved in 
this case should be rejoicing.
Setting of the Federal District  
Court Case
Sentinel was an unusual FCM in that it 
did not engage in futures trading activities 
on behalf of its customers.4 Sentinel was reg-
istered as a FCM solely to receive customer 
assets held by other FCMs.5 Each FCM thus 
opened a customer account on the books of 
Sentinel, each labeled as “FCM’s Customer 
Omnibus Account”. Sentinel then invested 
the customer assets of these other FCMs in 
a customer segregated account, with each 
FCM selecting a different trading strategy 
as permitted by CFTC Rule 1.25.6 Sentinel 
also offered an asset management service for 
other clients. Sentinel thus provided an asset 
management investment service primarily 
for two groups, with each group subject to 
different regulatory requirements. The first 
group, namely, the other FCMs, that invested 
futures customer assets that they held in their 
respective Customer Segregated Accounts 
into the Sentinel Customer Segregated Ac-
count, were referred to as the “SEG 1 Pool” 
in this case. The second group of Sentinel 
customers, namely the other private inves-
tors, including hedge funds, corporations and 
proprietary assets of FCMs, were referred to 
as the “SEG 3 Pool”.7 The SEG 1 Pool re-
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quired Sentinel to be registered as an FCM. The 
SEG 3 Pool required Sentinel to be registered as an 
IA. As a registered FCM and IA, Sentinel was thus 
required to keep the assets in the SEG 1 Pool and the 
SEG 3 Pool separate and distinct from each other. It 
did not.8 Sentinel pooled the assets of both the SEG 
1 Pool and the SEG 3 Pool to purchase securities, in-
cluding repo transactions. When the credit markets 
started to contract in 2007, many of Sentinel’s repo 
counterparties ceased doing business with Sentinel 
or required greater financial protections. In August 
2007, Sentinel’s house crashed.
On August 20, 2007, Sentinel filed an emergen-
cy order with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, seeking an order ap-
proving the distribution of the proceeds of the se-
curities sold to Citadel.9 This Order was supported 
and approved by both the CFTC and the National 
Futures Association (“NFA”). On August 21, 2007, 
approximately $297 million of the assets managed 
by Sentinel were distributed directly into the Cus-
tomer Segregated Accounts of the 14 FCMs that had 
invested their futures customer assets into the SEG 1 
Pool. Of this amount, approximately $14,479,000 
was distributed directly into the Customer Segregat-
ed Account of FCStone. Only a small amount was 
distributed to customers who had invested their as-
sets in the SEG 3 Pool.
Frederick J. Grede was appointed as the Liqui-
dation Trustee of the Sentinel estate on December 
17, 2007, some four months after the proceeds of 
the Citadel sale were distributed to the Customer 
Segregated Accounts of the various FCMs that in-
vested their customer assets in the SEG 1 Pool.10 In 
September 2008, Mr. Grede brought the action in 
the federal district court to avoid (e.g., claw back) 
the transfer of the assets that were distributed to the 
SEG 1 Pool in August 2007 under the theory that 
the assets belonged pro rata to both the SEG 1 Pool 
and the SEG 3 Pool.11
The Federal District Court Decision
On January 4, 2013, Judge James Zagel ruled 
that the pre-petition transfer was voidable as a pref-
erential transfer and the post-petition transfer of 
$14,479,000, that had been distributed to the Cus-
tomer Segregated Account12 of FCStone in August 
2007, must be returned to the bankrupt estate of 
Sentinel.13 As noted above, in August 2007, pursu-
ant to a Court Order,14 funds had been distributed 
out of the bankrupt estate of Sentinel15 directly into 
Customer Segregated Accounts of several Futures 
Commission Merchants (“FCMs”), including the 
afore-mentioned Customer Segregated Account of 
FC Stone, the Defendant in this case.16 None of the 
funds were distributed directly to these FCMs.
Judge Zagel agreed with the Trustee and held, in 
essence, as follows:
1. As to the pre-petition transfer, the safe harbor 
provisions of Section 546(e) of the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court could not conceivably be applied 
to this case. To do so would be inequitable, 
and thus an uneven and arbitrary distribution 
to Sentinel’s various customers (e.g., the SEG 1 
and SEG 3 Pools) and that Congress did not 
intend for this inequitable treatment when it 
enacted the safe harbor provisions.
2. The custody rule adopted by the SEC pursuant 
to the IAA, namely SEC Rule 206(4)-2, created 
a statutory trust protection as robust as those 
set forth under the Commodity Exchange Act 
(“CEA”) and applicable CFTC regulations. 
Therefore, the SEG 3 Pool customers have an 
equally forceful claim to trust protection as the 
SEG 1 Pool customers.
3. FCStone is subject to common law tracing re-
quirements due to the co-equal claims of the 
competing trust claimants. The assets distribut-
ed to the Customer Segregated Accounts of the 
various FCMs back in August 2007 are prop-
erty of the Sentinel bankrupt estate and were 
not “customer property” as defined by the CEA 
and applicable CFTC regulations.
4. The August 2007 distribution to the FCStone’s 
Customer Segregated Accounts was not au-
thorized under the Bankruptcy Code or by the 
bankruptcy court.
Judge Zagel’s First Conclusion  
of Law
Sentinel II is a case of first impression regarding 
the bankruptcy of a firm registered as both an FCM 
and as an IA. The issue before Judge Zagel in Sen-
tinel II was whether the statutory trust created by 
Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) of the CEA was superior 
to the IA Custody Rule adopted by the SEC. Defen-
dant FCStone made several arguments in support of 
this theory, namely:
1. The customer protections provided by Congress 
in Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) of the Commodity 
Exchange Act of 1936 were stronger than those 
resulting from a single SEC regulation requiring 
funds to be held with a custodian. In fact, Con-
CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1
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gress has never enacted any such similar provi-
sion in the IAA.
2. Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) of the CEA emphati-
cally states that the assets held in a Customer 
Segregated Account must be treated as cus-
tomer property “belonging to” the customer 
regardless of their location. In other words, 
the CEA created a “floating trust” over such 
customer property17 whereas the IA Custody 
Rule merely requires that customer assets be 
segregated from the IA’s own assets. Therefore, 
Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) made clear that the 
statutory trust imposed on customer segregated 
funds means that the assets in question, e.g., 
the SEG 1 Pool assets, could never be treated as 
the property of the depository (e.g., Sentinel). 
Therefore, unless the SEG 1 Pool assets become 
property of the Sentinel estate, it could never be 
clawed back by the Trustee and redistributed to 
the SEG 3 Pool. 
3. The legislative history accompanying Sections 
4d(a) and 4d(b) of the CEA clearly demonstrate 
that segregation violations and improper com-
mingling of customer funds do not destroy the 
statutory trust created under the CEA.18
4. Congress did not intend to protect IA advisory 
client funds in the same manner as FCM cus-
tomer funds because no provision under the 
IAA provides the specific customer protections 
that Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) do.
5. The risks unique to the futures markets demand 
that FCM customer-held property be afforded 
heightened protections compared to IA custom-
er funds.
6. The CFTC has promulgated a series of detailed 
regulations regarding how customer assets must 
be held, reported and maintained whereas the 
IA Custody Rule merely requires that customer 
assets be held in one of three types of custodian 
firms.19
Judge Zagel did not accept any of these arguments and 
held that the IA Custody Rule is also a statutory trust, 
just like Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b), and that Congress 
did not intend to elevate protections for customer funds 
regulated by the CEA and CFTC regulations over cus-
tomer funds regulated by the IA Custody Rule. He then 
stated: “there is no basis in law for elevating one federal 
statutory trust over another absent the tracing of specific 
property.”20 Judge Zagel basically holds that when two 
trusts require segregation, without analyzing any other 
requirement, then the two trusts must be treated equally. 
He then stated: 
“Until Congress demonstrates a clear 
intention to give commodity customers so-
called ‘super priority’ in bankruptcy, I have 
no basis for elevating the interests of the 
CEA over IAA-protected customers.”21
Judge Zagel’s Second Conclusion  
of Law
Judge Zagel also held that FCStone is subject to 
common law tracing due to the co-equal claims of 
the competing trust claimants. He then stated that 
FCStone failed to meet this tracing standard. In fact, 
he stated that such tracing was impossible. FCS-
tone’s expert did in fact identify the location of the 
SEG 1 Pool assets but this, according to the court, is 
indicative of why tracing is not possible in this case. 
He then stated:
“But for tracing purposes, the critical 
shortcoming of Ms. McCloskey’s report 
is that it fails to adequately account for 
the fact that none of Sentinel’s customers 
(referring to the FCMs) held specific 
ownership interests in securities. Rather 
they own pro rata portions of investment 
portfolios which Sentinel was free to fill 
with any of the securities in its pool of 
assets so long as those securities met the 
portfolio’s investment criteria.”
Judge Zagel believed that the “fungible nature of 
cash alone makes it impossible to trace specific secu-
rities back to the original customer deposits in this 
case.”22 He then stated:
“So, commingling aside, Sentinel’s 
investment model makes tracing essentially 
impossible because, upon deposit, customer 
funds were immediately converted into 
an abstract ownership interest. In other 
words, Sentinel’s pooled investment model 
renders tracing impracticable because there 
is no specific form of converted trust property 
to trace.”23
In support of FCStone’s position and that of the CFTC, 
the critical case to analyze is Begier v. I.R.S.24 Begier 
holds, in essence, that trust assets should not be deemed 
property of the bankrupt estate and that tracing is not 
required if a nexus can be shown between the assets re-
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ceived by the beneficiary and those held in trust by the 
debtor. In its Amicus Brief in Sentinel II in the 7th Circuit 
case, the CFTC stated:
“The nexus approach requires that the 
federal trust claimant must establish ‘some 
connection’ between the original trust 
assets defined by the relevant statute and 
the ‘assets sought to be applied’ to the 
trust claim subsequently in circumstances 
where the original trust assets have 
been commingled or transferred (citing 
Begier, 496 U.S. at 65-66). The court has 
flexibility in determining what connection 
is sufficient in particular circumstances so 
long as it ‘applies reasonable assumptions 
to govern the tracing of funds…’ These 
reasonable assumptions can include, 
but are not restricted to, common law 
tracing.”25
Judge Zagel held that, since the FCMs deposited cash 
with Sentinel, such cash is intangible and cannot be 
traced.26 The SEC in its Amicus Brief concurred with 
Judge Zagel and distinguished Begier by stating that Be-
gier is inapplicable as Begier did not involve competing 
claims by beneficiaries of two trusts, as applies here.27
Judge Zagel’s Third Conclusion  
of Law
Judge Zagel held that the transfer of assets to the 
Customer Segregated Accounts of FCStone (and all 
of the other FCMs) was not authorized by the Bank-
ruptcy Code or by the Bankruptcy Court. As noted 
above, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois permitted this distribution 
on August 20, 2007.28 Judge Zagel stated that the 
Bankruptcy Court did issue an Order stating that 
the assets, less a $15.6 million holdback, could be 
distributed to the Customer Segregated Accounts 
of the various FCMs. Judge Zagel then stated that 
the Order said nothing about whether the proceeds 
were property of the estate. Approximately, one 
year later, on August 8, 2008, the Trustee for Sen-
tinel filed a Motion to Clarify or in the Alternative 
to Vacate or Modify the Court’s August 20, 2007 
Order. In open court, the judge then explained that 
the August 20, 2007 Order had not ruled on the 
“property of the estate” issue.
Appeal of the Federal District  
Court Decision
The district court case was appealed to the Sev-
enth Circuit. Oral arguments were held in December 
2013. On March 19, 2014, the Seventh Circuit re-
versed Judge Zagel’s decision, primarily determining 
that the pre-petition transfer and the post-petition 
transfer to FCStone were proper, and should not be 
avoided (e.g., claw-backed), in accordance with Sec-
tions 546(e) and 549 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 
respectively, and remanded the case back to the dis-
trict court.29 30 This article will now analyze the Sev-
enth Circuit decision and provide some commentary 
as to whether the Seventh Circuit properly ruled in 
this case.
The Seventh Circuit Decision
Judge David Hamilton of the Seventh Circuit, in 
a 3-0 decision,31 wrote the opinion for the Seventh 
Circuit and narrowly ruled that the pre-and post-
petition transfers should not be avoided (e.g., not 
subject to being clawed-back) pursuant to Section 
546(e)32 and Section 54933 of the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code. As discussed below, since the Seventh Cir-
cuit ruled solely on whether the transfers should or 
should not be avoided, it elected not to decide on 
the other legal issues addressed by Judge Zagel. As 
noted above, its reference to these other conclusions 
of law posited by Judge Zagel, without any explana-
tion or analysis, is what is most troublesome. 
The Pre-Petition Transfer
A bankruptcy trustee may, pursuant to Section 
547(b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,34 avoid a trans-
fer that took place within 90 days of the filing of 
the bankruptcy petition if certain conditions were 
met. This provision, as the Seventh Circuit noted, 
is designed to 
“prevent a debtor approaching bankruptcy 
from choosing on its own to favor some 
creditors at the expense of others in ways 
that are not consistent with the priorities 
and preferences of bankruptcy law”. 35
The Seventh Circuit noted that Congress enacted Section 
546(e) to exempt payments in securities transactions 
from Section 547(b). Section 546(e) exempts transfers, 
such as a margin payment, if the transfer constituted a 
“settlement payment” or was made “in connection with 
a securities contract”.36 The Seventh Circuit then held:
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“We agree with FCStone that Sentinel’s 
pre-petition transfer fell within Section 
546(e)’s safe harbor. The district court’s 
findings of fact show that the transfer to 
FCStone was a “settlement payment” and 
was made “in connection with a securities 
contract’ within the meaning of Section 
546(e).”37
The Seventh Circuit then stated:
“Section 546(e) states that the trustee 
may not avoid a pre-petition transfer made 
to a commodity broker that is either a 
‘settlement payment’ .… or ‘in connection 
with a securities contract’. The parties 
agree that FCStone is a commodity broker 
and that the transfer occurred before the 
commencement of the bankruptcy case. 
The only disputed issues are whether the 
transfer was a ‘settlement payment’ or 
was made ‘in connection with a securities 
contract’ as those terms are defined in the 
statute. If the answer to either question is 
yes, the safe harbor applies and the pre-
petition transfer may not be avoided. The 
answer to both questions is yes.”38
The Seventh Circuit held that both of these terms 
should be broadly interpreted. With respect to 
whether the transfer was made “in connection with 
a securities contract”, the Seventh Circuit deter-
mined that, even though Sentinel’s customers, such 
as FC Stone, did not have rights to specific securi-
ties, they could authorize Sentinel to purchase or sell 
securities as they saw fit. It then stated: 
“The fact that the Segment 1 customers 
were entitled to cash rather than to the 
securities themselves does not change 
the fact that these customers’ investment 
agreements were contracts for the 
purchase and sale of securities.”39
The Seventh Circuit concluded that Judge Zagel’s 
decision was not based on the literal text of Section 
546(e) but on policy grounds.40 The Seventh Circuit 
then stated:
“We understand the district’s court 
powerful and equitable purpose, but its 
reasoning runs directly contrary to the 
broad language of Section 546(e). The 
text of Section 546(e) does not include an 
exception for preferential transfers.”41
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that, through Sec-
tion 5646(e):
“Congress chose finality over equity for 
most pre-petition transfers in the securities 
industry…. In other words, Section 546(e) 
reflects a policy judgment by Congress that 
allowing some otherwise avoidable pre-
petition transfers in the securities industry 
to stand would probably be a lesser evil 
than the uncertainty and potential lack of 
liquidity that would be caused by putting 
every recipient of settlement payments 
in the past 90 days at risk of having its 
transactions unwound in bankruptcy 
court.”42
Thus, the Seventh Circuit found “no persuasive 
reason to depart from the deliberately broad text of 
Section 546(e)”.43 
The Post-Petition Transfer
Under Section 549 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 
a post-petition transfer of property of the estate can 
be avoided unless the transfer was authorized under 
the bankruptcy code or by the bankruptcy court.44 
In Sentinel II, the bankruptcy court issued an order 
in August 2007 (the “2007 Order”), shortly after 
the filing of the bankruptcy petition, permitting a 
distribution of approximately $300,000,000 direct-
ly into the customer segregated accounts of some 
14 FCMs, including FC Stone. One year later, the 
trustee requested the bankruptcy court to clarify the 
2007 Order, in particular, that the transfer in 2007 
did not affect the trustee’s right to avoid this post-
petition transfer. Surprisingly, in 2008, the bank-
ruptcy court held that “its order (issued in 2007) 
had not authorized the transfer within the meaning 
of Section 549 and thus did not prevent avoidance 
of the post-petition transfer.”45 Judge Zagel held 
that the 2007 Order thus did not authorize this 
transfer within the meaning of Section 549.
The Seventh Circuit disagreed with Judge Zagel’s 
conclusion. It held that the 2007 Order “was clearly 
authorized by the bankruptcy court” and that its 
subsequent order, issued in 2008 was an abuse of 
discretion.46 It sensibly determined that the so-called 
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clarification ran counter to the “plain language of 
the order”.47
The Seventh Circuit then held that it is not nec-
essary for a court to decide whether the property 
being transferred belongs to the estate and that the 
bankruptcy court need not determine that the trans-
fer involves property of the estate. A court, it held, 
can simply authorize a transfer whether the prop-
erty belonged to the estate or not.48 In this case, the 
2007 Order issued by the bankruptcy court “ended 
any discussion about its original ownership, and the 
disputed property cannot later be clawed back by 
the trustee.49 The 2007 Order thus did not reserve 
for the Sentinel trustee the right to avoid the transfer 
that occurred in August 2007.
The Seventh Circuit then focused on the literal 
language of the 2007 Order, holding that the lan-
guage being asserted by the Trustee is meritless. The 
Seventh Circuit’s rational approach focused on the 
events that took place in August 2007, namely that:
1. The various FCMs, including FCStone, needed 
BONY to release the money within hours of the 
original Order being issued. Otherwise, FCS-
tone would have been insolvent itself if it could 
not transfer the money to meet its obligations 
to its own customers.
2. The district court’s views would undermine 
the ability of involved parties to rely ever on a 
bankruptcy court order. In this case, the FCMs 
clearly relied on the original Order and should 
be allowed to assume that the transfer to their 
customer segregated accounts were unencum-
bered.50
3. To not allow the transfer that took place in Au-
gust 2007 would result in losses to its current 
customers and creditors, and not those that 
would have been affected in August 2007.51
4. The bankruptcy court should have clarified the 
2007 Order before any interested party relies 
on the Order.
This ruling reflects proper yet practical reasoning, 
emphasizing the reliance test for parties, which re-
ceive a post-petition distribution and the fact that 
the claw-back would have occurred some seven 
years later.
Other Legal Issues Addressed by 
Judge Zagel
Had the Seventh Circuit stopped there, one can 
easily argue that it simply took a narrow but specific 
interpretation of the language in Sections 546(e) 
and 549 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Its practical 
reasoning could easily be justified. In future FCM 
bankruptcies, interested parties could evaluate 
whether the safe harbors of Section 546(e) might 
apply to a pre-petition transfer and whether a post-
petition transfer was authorized or not by a bank-
ruptcy court.
However, the Seventh Circuit, for some unknown 
reason, chose to address some of Judge Zagel’s other 
Conclusions of Law noted above, but provided little 
or no explanation or analysis of them. In fact, it 
chose not to base its decision on any of them. 
One of these issues involved whether FCStone was 
an initial transferee or an beneficiary of the transfer 
as required by Section 550(a)(1) of the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code.52 If so, the transfer could be avoided. 
The Seventh Circuit did not decide the ultimate issue 
but did state, in a footnote, that FCStone was “nec-
essarily either an initial transferee or a beneficiary 
under Section 550(a)(1)”.53 This language in the 
footnote could have a significant adverse impact on 
future FCM failures. Historically, when one FCM 
fails, the CFTC or an exchange, such as the CME, 
steps in and works together to find a home quick-
ly for futures customers of the failed FCM so that 
monies used to margin the open positions and the 
open futures positions themselves of customers at 
the failed FCM are transferred to another well-cap-
italized FCM. This language in the footnote could 
theoretically hold up an immediate transfer unless 
and until the trustee appointed by the CFTC obtains 
an Order from the Bankruptcy Court that expressly 
authorizes these transfers. It can take days, if not 
weeks, to obtain such an Order from the bankrupt-
cy court. Query, will this case force future trustees 
appointed by the court to simply take actions quick-
ly to liquidate all open positions on the books of the 
failed FCM. What about those positions held by bo-
na-fide hedgers, which are clearly protected against 
any such liquidation by Part 190?54 Query, will this 
case be used by future FCM trustees to hold up any 
transfers of the open positions of hedgers and their 
margin monies to another FCM until the trustee can 
obtain a clear bankruptcy court order? This would 
be quite troubling in my opinion. Prompt immedi-
ate action is required when an FCM fails so that its 
customers can be properly protected.
Also, what is most concerning is that it provided 
no analysis or explanation as to why an FCM is an 
initial transferee. No other case has dealt with this 
issue involving FCMs; all other cases involve an in-
solvent broker-dealer. The crucial test in determin-
ing whether a brokerage firm is an initial transferee 
is whether the firm exercises dominion and control 
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over the assets/funds of the bankrupt estate. Pursu-
ant to the Securities Exchange Act and applicable 
SEC regulations, broker-dealers have more control 
over their customer assets, especially when the cus-
tomer purchases securities on margin. On the other 
hand FCMs, in my opinion, merely act as an agent 
for their customers and provide a mere conduit of 
the margin amounts paid by their customers to the 
respective clearinghouse.55 The dominion and con-
trol test was not addressed by the Seventh Circuit as 
it applies to FCMs. Its silence is deafening.56
A second important Conclusion of Law posited 
by Judge Zagel involved the concept that the statu-
tory trusts that were created by the Commodity 
Exchange Act and the Investment Advisers Act are 
equitable and that the underlying customers should 
be treated equitably. The Seventh Circuit agreed 
with Judge Zagel that “there is no basis for placing 
one trust ahead of the other despite FCStone’s and 
the CFTC’s attempts to argue otherwise.”57 How-
ever, the Seventh Circuit provided no guidance or 
explanation of its position other than to state that it 
believed that the Cunningham case had more merit 
than Begier.58 These cases, among other things, in-
volved the property of the estate issue, which the 
Seventh Circuit said was not relevant. More impor-
tantly, the Seventh Circuit did not discuss the equal-
ity vs. equity trust elements which were noted in my 
prior article, that is whether the explicit provisions 
found in Section 4d of Commodity Exchange Act 
and the specific CFTC regulations, which together 
clearly govern how FCMs must handle futures cus-
tomer property control the issue versus a single SEC 
rule that simply states that investment advisers must 
deposit their customer assets in one of three types of 
custodians.59 
The Seventh Circuit thus combined these two 
Conclusions of Law in a very strange way. It should 
have either not addressed these other legal issues 
posited by Judge Zagel or explained its interpreta-
tion in more detail.
Possible Impact of The 7TH Circuit’s 
Decision on Sentinel I60
As noted in my prior article, Frederick Grede as 
the Liquidation Trustee, filed an earlier case against 
Bank of New York Mellon (“BONY”), which acted 
as the custodian for Sentinel’s repo and futures cus-
tomer accounts. Grede sought $312 million from 
BONY claiming that BONY knew about Senti-
nel’s fraudulent use of its customer assets and thus 
BONY acted inequitably and unlawfully. On Au-
gust 12, 2012, Judge Zagel ruled that BONY was 
not liable for the actions taken by Sentinel with re-
spect to its fraudulent movement of assets from its 
customer accounts to an account held in the name 
of Sentinel on BONY’s books. Judge Zagel found 
that Grede had “failed to prove that Sentinel made 
the Transfers with the actual intent to hinder, de-
lay or defraud its creditors.”61 On November 30, 
2012, without any explanation, the 7th Circuit va-
cated Judge Zagel’s decision in Sentinel I and held 
that this appeal remains under consideration by the 
panel.62 On August 26, 2013, the 7th Circuit over-
turned Judge Zagel’s lower court decision regarding 
Grede’s fraudulent transfer and equitable subordi-
nation claims and remanded the case back to the 
district court for further proceedings. 
Conclusion
The Trustee has filed a petition before the Seventh 
Circuit to request that the Seventh Circuit reconsid-
er its decision. This motion had not been decided as 
of the date of this article. It will be interesting to see 
whether this motion will be granted or not. It will 
also be interesting to see whether the Trustee only 
brings the action in Sentinel I against BONY, given 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in that prior case to 
remand that case back to the district court, or seeks 
to bring both cases (e.g., Sentinel I and II) back si-
multaneously to the district court. Further, it will be 
interesting to see whether either of the two Seventh 
Circuit decisions in Sentinel I and II will reach the 
U.S. Supreme Court.
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